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We propose a new, valuation-based measure of world equity market segmentation. While we observe
decreased levels of segmentation in many developing countries, the level of segmentation is still significant.
In contrast to previous research, we characterize the factors that account for variation in market segmentation
both through time as well as across countries. While a country's regulation with respect to foreign
capital flows is important in determining its level of segmentation, we find that non-regulatory factors
are also related to the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the level of segmentation. We identify
a country's political risk profile and its stock market development as two additional local segmentation
factors as well as the U.S. corporate credit spread as a global segmentation factor.
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The removal of capital controls in both developed countries (mostly during the eighties)
and emerging markets (mostly at the end of the eighties and the early nineties) has led
to unparalleled ¯nancial openness across the world. The trade sector is also more open.
These important structural changes should have had a profound e®ect on the valuation
of stocks across the globe, and hence on important economic issues such as the cost of
capital, international diversi¯cation bene¯ts, and international risk sharing. In particular,
globalization may have served to integrate equity markets across the world.
Our research has three goals. First, we propose a new measure of the degree of e®ective or
de facto equity market segmentation. The country-level measure is based on industry-level
earnings yield di®erentials, aggregated across all industries in a given country. We show
that under the null hypothesis of full ¯nancial and economic integration, industry earnings
yield di®erentials between a country and the world market should be (i) relatively small and
fairly constant over time and (ii) explained entirely by di®erences in ¯nancial leverage and
earnings volatility. Using data from within the U.S., an e®ectively integrated economy, we
con¯rm that segmentation measured by randomly splitting U.S. data into pseudo-countries
is small (with a mean of 1.4%) and fairly constant (with a time-series standard deviation of
0.25%) relative to the level of measured segmentation for developed countries (with a mean
of 2.7% and an average time series standard deviation of 1.5%) and for emerging market
economies (with a mean of 4.4% and an average time series standard deviation of 2.6%).
Importantly and in contrast to many existing studies, our framework does not depend on a
speci¯c asset pricing model. Finally, measuring the degree of segmentation within the U.S.
equity market provides us with a meaningful empirical benchmark to distinguish between
e®ectively segmented and integrated markets.
Second, we apply our segmentation measure to a large set of ¯fty countries over a sample
period of more than 20 years. We document the extent to which market segmentation has
decreased over time. Using our empirical benchmark, we observe that the group of developed
countries has been e®ectively integrated since 1993, while emerging markets continue to
1display levels of segmentation above our benchmark.
Third, we estimate the contribution of both ¯nancial and trade openness to the marked
reduction in measured segmentation. In addition to the e®ects of these regulatory or de jure
globalization factors, we examine the degree to which other (country) factors e®ectively de-
termine the degree of observed market segmentation. It is important to note that under the
alternative hypothesis (i.e. some degree of market segmentation), any country characteristic
correlated with local growth opportunities or local discount rates may in°uence prices. More-
over, factors such as political risk, liquidity risk, poor corporate governance, or ine±cient
markets may generate implicit barriers to important institutional investors and lead to de
facto segmentation. It is also possible that factors a®ecting investors in major markets (their
preferences, the level of interest rates, etc.) a®ect price convergence across the world. Instead
of imposing a particular view about which factors matter the most, we employ an empirical
model reduction technique proposed by Hendry (1995) to select the statistically relevant
factors. We judge their economic importance by using a novel covariance decomposition.
Overall, our approach suggests that in addition to ¯nancial and trade openness, a country's
political risk pro¯le, its stock market development and the the U.S. corporate credit spread,
are statistically and economicly signi¯cant in explaining the variation in segmentation.
Our empirical results provide useful guidance for theoretical research. While formal
international pricing models can lead to subtle empirical predictions, they tend to focus
on only a few key determinants of international pricing di®erences. For example, much
of the recent literature (see, for example, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Hail and Leuz
(2006), and Albuquerque and Wang (2008)) focuses on cross-country di®erences in corporate
governance, setting aside other potentially important factors, such as ¯nancial openness and
stock market development. While our methodology allows us to empirically distinguish the
relative importance of these factors, it should also be helpful for research in other areas
where empirical complexity hinders the development of more comprehensive models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces our
measure of market segmentation. In section 3, we characterize the degree of market segmen-
tation across countries and industries. We apply our measure to the U.S. equity market in
order to develop a benchmark for an e®ectively integrated market. In section 4, we explore
2the pure time-series variation in the degree of segmentation and the role for de jure global-
ization. While de jure openness has a signi¯cant e®ect on de facto segmentation, it cannot
fully account for the downward trend we observe in segmentation levels. Section 5 contains
the main results on what factors determine the variation in observed market segmentation
across countries and time. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. In the ¯nal section,
we o®er some conclusions and discuss some related literature.
2 A new measure of market segmentation
We view each country as a portfolio of industries where an industry's portfolio weight corre-
sponds to the relative (equity) market value of the industry in the country portfolio. De¯ne
the weight of industry j in country i by IWi;j;t. Let EYi;j;t denote industry j's earnings
yield, the inverse of the price earnings ratio, as determined locally in country i and EYw;j;t
the corresponding earnings yield as determined in global capital markets. Our main vari-
able of analysis is the absolute value of the di®erence between industry valuation ratios,
jEYi;j;t ¡ EYw;j;tj. We propose the weighted sum of these local-global industry valuation





IWi;j;tjEYi;j;t ¡ EYw;j;tj; (1)
for N industries.
Note that our measure requires nothing more than industry-level valuation ratios which
are observed at every point in time and are not estimated. This contrasts with the standard
international ¯nance literature that employs estimated measures of segmentation based on,
for example, the evolution of equity return correlations or systematic risk exposures (e.g.,
world market portfolio betas); see Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2007) and the references
therein. However, the construction of these measures requires both historical data and a
particular estimation methodology. Further, as their interpretation requires a formal inter-
national asset pricing model (about which there is little consensus), estimation error is likely
compounded by model mis-speci¯cation.
In Appendix A, we present a pricing model with stochastic growth opportunities and
3discount rates that links the measure to the concepts of market integration and segmentation.
Most importantly, under a strong notion of integration, encompassing both ¯nancial and
economic integration, the time-varying components comprising the industry price-earnings
ratios are identical, being driven entirely by variation in the world discount rate and world
growth opportunities.
Note that the model describes the determinants of price-earnings ratios; however, we use
their inverse, earnings yields, in our empirical work. We do so for a number of reasons. First,
the distribution of price-earnings ratios is highly positively skewed, increasing the risk that
outliers may a®ect the analysis. Second, and most importantly, price earnings ratios are
not de¯ned when earnings are zero. Third, earnings yield di®erentials are easier to interpret
given that they are expressed in percentage terms.1
We now review the model assumptions that deliver the equalization of valuation di®er-
entials across countries. The model we provide helps to develop our understanding of where
country-speci¯c e®ects may arise, but the usefulness of our measure does not hinge in any
way on a particular parameterization of this model.2 First, we assume a constant world
interest rate. Later, we add the world real interest rate as one of the potential determinants
of SEG. However, it is not likely that real rates account for much of the variation in earnings
yield ratios.
Second, we assume that systematic risk for a given industry is identical across countries.
This is the key assumption rendering the SEG measure independent of local discount rate
variation under the null of integration. While this is the typical textbook assumption, the
industry classi¯cation may not be homogenous enough to make this an acceptable assump-
tion. We deal with this in two ways. We use an industry classi¯cation that is quite granular
compared to other work, involving (N=) 38 di®erent industries (see below). In addition,








2The model also implies other restrictions on the nature of local earnings yields in relation to their
global counterparts, for instance, their degree of comovement across time should become more pronounced.
However, investigating such implications again relinquishes the estimation-free nature of our measure.
4in section 3.2, we use this industry classi¯cation on a large integrated market (the U.S.) to
verify that portfolios within industries have comparable multiples and to uncover any biases
that may arise in our measure.
Third, we assume that the same industry in di®erent countries has identical ¯nancial risk.
Because country speci¯c circumstances may induce di®erent leverage ratios across countries,
we verify that our results are robust to the inclusion of country-speci¯c leverage ratios. Note
that other valuation measures, such as for example Tobin's q, would not require assumptions
about ¯nancial risk. At the same time, the time series of available accounting data for a
large set of countries is very limited and would not allow us to examine the long sample
period we are interested in.3
Fourth, we assume that the earnings growth process for each industry-country portfo-
lio depends on an persistent industry-speci¯c, but country-independent growth opportunity
process and a country and industry-speci¯c shock that is not persistent. Consequently, only
worldwide growth opportunities are priced.4 The assumption that only world factors drive
growth opportunities is common. For example, research by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
Fisman and Love (2004), makes this assumption quite explicitly, arguing that growth oppor-
tunities primarily arise through technological shocks. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel
(BHLS) (2007) show that, in fact, global growth opportunities (measured using industry
valuation ratios) predict real economic growth for both developed and emerging markets.
Under these assumptions, the weighted sum of these industry level absolute valuation
di®erences should be small and relatively constant over time. The equalization of industry
valuations is consistent with factor price equalization as implied by classical trade models
(see for example Samuelson (1948)). But even under the more recent trade literature that
explicitly allows for geography and di®erences in the level of productivity across countries
(see for example Eaton and Kortum (2002)), we expect industry valuations to be the same
across countries unless entry or exit barriers exist, as factor prices for the immobile factors
3For example, Chua, Eun, and Lai (2007) study market level Tobin's q for 49 countries between 1999 and
2004.
4Even under the null of integration, our formulation implies that the constant term in the price-earnings
ratios still depends on local earnings growth volatility. In our empirical work, we are careful to add a measure
of earnings growth volatility di®erentials to deal with this dependence.
5will adjust to the spatial variation in productivity such that capital is indi®erent between
di®erent locations (see Venables (2006)).
Of course, most countries will be segmented to some degree according to this de¯nition.
Our approach then tests the degree to which local and global factors matter for valuation
once we have controlled for a country's global growth opportunities present in its industry
mix. We conjecture that a main driver of such segmentation is de jure access: some markets
are simply legally closed for foreign investment. But even when a country is formally open to
foreign capital, international investors may shun markets with weak corporate governance,
keeping discount rates local and likely higher. There may also be interesting interaction
e®ects between openness and weak corporate governance, which partially undo this e®ect.
While one might want to associate segmentation with \low" prices, segmentation need not
be asymmetric. For example, in markets with irrational agents, segmentation could cause
over-pricing (see Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) for an argument as to how excessive
speculation caused Chinese A-shares, traded by locals, to be over-priced relative to B-shares,
traded by foreigners). Likewise, regulations may protect local industries against foreign
competition and improve cash °ow prospects.
3 Characterizing segmentation in countries and industries
In this section, we ¯rst describe the construction of the segmentation measure, SEG, and
report summary statistics. We then measure the relative importance of country and industry
e®ects in the SEG measures at the country-industry level. Finally, we establish an easily
interpretable benchmark for the remainder of the analysis by examining the SEG measure
within one large country, the U.S.
3.1 Segmentation in countries and industries
We construct our measure of segmentation, SEG, for a sample of 50 countries, using monthly
data from Datastream as well as from the Standard & Poors' Emerging Market Data Base
(EMDB) between 1973 and 2005. While monthly SEG measures are constructed (and are
presented in subsequent ¯gures), we conduct most of our subsequent analysis at the annual
6frequency from 1980-2005 given the availability of other variables.
For 22 mainly developed countries, we collect equity market value data at the industry
level from Datastream, which typically covers about 85% of a country's equity market. We
use the industry market value to determine a country's industry composition in the form
of 38 portfolio weights, IWi;j;t, that re°ect the Industry Classi¯cation Benchmark (ICB)
framework employed by Datastream.5 For the same set of countries and industries, we
also obtain industry earnings yields from Datastream. Datastream calculates these earnings
yields by adding (generally trailing) 12-month non-negative ¯rm-level earnings across ¯rms
in a given industry and country and then dividing aggregated earnings by the aggregated
market value of the ¯rms in the industries.
For the remaining 28 emerging market countries, we use EMDB to obtain market values
and trailing 12-month earnings data at the ¯rm level. To be consistent with the Datastream
data, we set negative ¯rm level earnings to zero. We then aggregate the ¯rm level data
according to the industry classi¯cation employed by Datastream.6 For each industry and
country, we calculate local earnings yields and portfolio weights. Appendix Table 1 lists all
50 countries and the data source used for each country.
For the construction of our segmentation measure as de¯ned in (1), we also require global
industry earnings yields. We obtain these from Datastream's global industry portfolios that
represent a weighted average of local industries. We adjust these global industry earnings
yields to exclude Japanese data as previous research (see for example French and Poterba
(1991)) has shown that Japanese accounting standards lead to an arti¯cial depression of
Japanese earnings yields. Japanese earnings yields are roughly 70% smaller, on average,
than their global counterparts. While these known accounting di®erences could impact our
¯ndings in an important way, the qualitative di®erences in the results are in fact minimal.
Results that include Japan are available upon request.
5Note that in addition to the 38 industries used in our study (see Table 2 for a list of these industries),
Datastream also employs a \Nonequity Investment Instruments" category which we exclude.
6EMDB classi¯es ¯rms according to the Global Industry Classi¯cation Standard (GICS). We construct a
concordance table between the 150 GICS categories used by EMDB and the 38 ICB categories used in this
study and assign each ¯rm an ICB industry code. The concordance between both classi¯cation systems is
available upon request.
7Table 1 ¯rst reports the time series average and standard deviation of our country seg-
mentation measure, SEG, for all countries in our sample. Our sample is unbalanced: we
have 26 years of data for most developed counties, but the average number of years with
data for emerging market countries is only about 17.7 At the bottom of the table, we report
the cross-sectional averages of these statistics for the set of developed, emerging, and all
countries. We observe that emerging markets on average exhibit larger earnings yields dif-
ferentials as well as larger °uctuations of SEG over time than do developed countries. The
\Rank" column shows that over the last ¯ve years, the U.S. is the least segmented country,
whereas Venezuela is the most segmented.
The columns in the middle produce some preliminary information about how the seg-
mentation measures evolve over time. Segmentation for developed markets has fallen con-
siderably. The absolute earnings yield di®erential is 4.5%, on average, during 1980-1984, but
less than 2%, on average, during the 2001-2005 period. For emerging markets, the average
market segmentation measure falls from 5.8% in the ¯rst ¯ve years to 3.9% during 2001-2005.
While both developed and emerging markets exhibit yield convergence over time, industrial-
ized countries experience the largest drop in percentage terms. It should be pointed out that
segmentation also increases for a few emerging markets, such as Venezuela, a country which
experienced a signi¯cantly deteriorating political risk pro¯le. Figure 1 presents, separately
for developed and emerging markets, a cross-country average for SEG along with a time
trend. Consistent with the results in Table 1, emerging markets appear more segmented
relative to developed but SEG exhibits a strong downward trend for both sets of countries.
It is this variation of segmentation over time as well as across countries that we seek to
explain in this paper.
While most of our focus is on country segmentation, Table 2 also reports the main
statistics from Table 1 for industry-speci¯c segmentation. We observe that the absolute
value of the yield di®erential has decreased for 23, but increased for 15 industries over the
last two decades. The most integrated industry in recent years is the Software and Computer
Services industry; indeed, it is the only one with a segmentation measure less than 2%.
7Coverage for most developed countries actually starts in 1973. But our empirical analysis focuses on
1980 to 2005. See Appendix Table 1 for details.
8The ¯ve industries that appeared to be the most segmented in 1980-1984, namely Banks,
Life Insurance, General Retailers, Non-life Insurance, and Industrial Metals all exhibit a
signi¯cant reduction in their degree of measured segmentation. Interestingly, several of these
industries have experienced substantial deregulation and privatization in many countries
over the last two decades. This raises the question whether some of the country e®ects
we document later may be in°uenced by the industry mix of the country. For example,
imagine most countries protect their banking sectors, even after o±cial liberalization, until
worldwide technological (i.e., in telecommunication and web services) and regulatory changes
(i.e., changing BIS standards) force global deregulation. In this case, countries will appear
more or less segmented depending on the relative importance of the banking sector in the
industry mix. Finally, notice that the four most segmented industries during the more recent
period (2001 - 2005), Forestry & Paper, Industrial Metals, Travel & Leisure, and Mining are
largely endowment-based industries, the value of which depends to some extent on the price
of the immobile factor land.
To gauge the relative importance of industry versus country e®ects in our yield di®eren-
tials, we regress the annual industry-country level segmentation measures onto a constant,
38 industry indicators, and up to 50 country indicators. This methodology was introduced
by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) to distinguish between country and industry e®ects in
¯rm return data.8 To identify the parameters, we require the sum of all industry dum-
mies as well as the sum of all country dummies to add up to zero. We then calculate the
equally-weighted average absolute value of all industry dummies in a given year as well as
of all country dummies. These numbers are commonly known as Mean Absolute Deviations
(MAD), the relative magnitudes of which essentially show which e®ects are largest: country
or industry. We ¯nd (in results available upon request) that country e®ects are dominant,
but industry e®ects are important too. Both decline over time. However, the country e®ects
are most prominent starting in the mid 1980s, and are therefore likely associated with the
introduction of the emerging markets into the sample around that time.
8Bhoraj and Ng (2007) apply the methodology to valuation ratios.
93.2 Developing a benchmark: segmentation in the U.S.
Over the last ¯ve years, the average segmentation measure in the industrialized countries
was 1.9%. Given di®erences in leverage, earnings volatility across countries, imperfect homo-
geneity within industry classes, and/or just plain measurement error, is this a large number,
a small number, or what we would expect in relatively integrated countries? In this section,
we benchmark our measure of segmentation by examining its value within one country, the
U.S. Given that we sample ¯rms within one country, any measured segmentation cannot be
ascribed to international market segmentation.
We obtain earnings and equity market value data from Datastream and annual leverage
data from Compustat between 1973 and 2006 for the 4,594 ¯rms that are covered by both
data vendors. We classify each ¯rm into one of the 38 Datastream ICB industries
We use the U.S. sample of ¯rms to construct 100 random samples, each of which resembles
our actual data set of 50 countries, with the aggregate U.S. market playing the role of the
world market. As Appendix B describes in detail, the random data sets approximately
replicate both the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the number of ¯rms in our
sample. This is important as an increase in the number of ¯rms within each portfolio may
increase the accuracy of the measured earnings yield. For each random data set and each
pseudo-\country" within such a set, we then compute the segmentation measure exactly as
we do for the actual countries. Figure 2 shows the average, as well as the 5th and 95th
percentile, of the degree of measured segmentation across the 100 random replications over
time. The U.S. segmentation measure does not exhibit an obvious trend. The degree of
segmentation for developed countries has declined through time to the average segmentation
level in our U.S. benchmark case, which is about 2%. Since about 1993, segmentation in
developed markets has moved within the 90% percentile con¯dence bound of the U.S. random
measure, but the measured segmentation for emerging markets is still well above it.9
To understand better what may cause the apparent segmentation found in the U.S. data,
we relate the annual segmentation measures for U.S. \countries" to four factors: a time
9We also conduct the more precise exercise of randomizing twice to be consistent with the separate groups
of developed and emerging countries, respectively. This exercise yields very similar results.
10trend, the log of the number of ¯rms in a given \country" and year, the weighted average
of the absolute di®erence between industry leverage in a given \country" and in the U.S. as
a whole, and the weighted average of the absolute di®erence between industry log earnings
growth volatility in a given \country" and the U.S.10
The earnings volatility and leverage variables have obvious implications for valuation
detailed earlier in Section 2, even under full market integration. Importantly, their temporal
variation may induce a downward trend in our segmentation measure. For example, the
general decline in macro-economic volatility since 1985 may have narrowed earnings volatility
di®erentials between ¯rms. Likewise, general ¯nancial development may make it easier for
¯rms to hit their target debt levels, narrowing leverage di®erentials between ¯rms. Finally,
if the number of ¯rms increased over time, this alone may create a lower segmentation
level; whereas cross-sectionally, \countries" with more ¯rms may on average show lower
segmentation levels.
Table 3 reports the results from running the regression on the 100 replications of our
data set. We report the distribution of coe±cient estimates and t-statistics. The signs of the
coe±cients are as expected, with the trend and number of ¯rms coe±cients being negative
and the earnings growth volatility and leverage di®erential coe±cients being positive. Fo-
cusing on the 95th (5th) percentile of the t-statistic distribution for the negative (positive)
coe±cients, only the number of ¯rms coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The trend
and earnings growth volatility di®erential coe±cients would be signi¯cant at lower critical
levels.11
10The data sources and computations are described in Appendix Table 2. We clarify how we compute
standard errors in Section 4.
11We also conducted a similar exercise with U.S. states serving as \countries," using Compustat to associate
a ¯rm's principle location with a U.S. state. Whereas the results (available upon request) are broadly
similar to our reported ¯ndings, there is a concern that U.S. states may actually display genuine valuation
di®erentials due to di®erential branching restrictions in the local banking system. Deregulation in the banking
system could then lead to a trend in the segmentation measure.
114 Market segmentation dynamics
Our empirical results rely on unbalanced panel regressions for 50 countries using annual data
from 1980 to 2005 of the form:
SEGi;t = ® + ¯
0xi;t + ´i;t; (2)
where SEGi;t is the year t measure of segmentation for country i, and xi;t represents the
various candidate explanatory variables. We use two estimation techniques. The ¯rst speci-
¯cation is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). However, the standard errors are corrected
for unspeci¯ed serial correlation within a given country and for cross-sectional correlation
across countries in a given year (see Thompson (2006)). These corrections have the e®ect of
increasing the standard errors relative to simple OLS.
To address the serial correlation in the error term in an alternative fashion, our second
approach uses a Prais-Winsten (1954) regression assuming that the autocorrelation coe±-
cient of the error term is the same for all countries. We follow Beck and Katz (1995) and
calculate panel corrected standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity across countries
as well as contemporaneous correlation of the error term between countries.12 To conserve
space, we only report coe±cient estimates and standard errors from the pooled OLS es-
timation. Bold coe±cients denote statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level under the panel
OLS speci¯cations. However, we indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 5% level under the
Prais-Winsten speci¯cations using underlined coe±cients. Generally, the results from the
Prais-Winsten regressions are broadly similar to the OLS speci¯cation results.
4.1 Establishing a trend
Table 4 provides three sets of unbalanced panel regressions of market segmentation (SEG)
on a time trend (labeled \I" for each). The ¯rst set, in Panel A, includes all 50 countries from
1980-2005. The coe±cient on the time trend is negative and statistically signi¯cant re°ect-
ing declines in market segmentation across time for a broad set of developed and emerging
12Given the unbalanced nature of our data set, we estimate the elements of the covariance matrix pairwise,
that is using for each pair of countries all years for which both countries have non-missing data.
12countries. The same message is evident in Panel B where we consider a sub-sample of 19 de-
veloped markets. When we consider the 31 emerging markets in Panel C (with data starting
in 1988), the downward trend is also negative, but no longer statistically signi¯cant. In the
full country sample case which will re°ect our main empirical focus henceforth, the regres-
sion R2 is not particularly large, suggesting that much of the variation in observed market
segmentation is not described by a simple time trend, despite the statistical signi¯cance of
the e®ect.
To evaluate the robustness of the time trend e®ect, we add the three control variables
also examined in the U.S. benchmark regression in Section 3.2 as additional explanatory
factors in column II. For all three samples, the time trend retains the same general sign
and signi¯cance. Also, the regression R2's increase signi¯cantly, re°ecting the importance of
the additional regression controls. Earnings growth volatility di®erentials are signi¯cantly
associated with larger earnings yield spreads across all three samples. This is consistent
with the theoretical prediction in the valuation model as well as the empirical results of the
U.S. study. While the leverage di®erential has the expected sign for all samples, it is not
statistically signi¯cant. Finally, we ¯nd a signi¯cant role for the number of ¯rms across all
three samples, corroborating the importance of that control highlighted in the U.S. study.
We conclude that there is a signi¯cant downward trend in segmentation of at least 7 basis
points per year.
4.2 Globalization and convergence
Globalization, particularly de jure ¯nancial and goods trade openness, has increased at a
tremendous pace over the last thirty years. Accordingly, the de jure globalization process
is the most obvious candidate determinant for the downward trend in SEG that we ob-
serve. In Table 5, we investigate the role of de jure ¯nancial and trade openness on market
segmentation.
We use two di®erent measures of ¯nancial openness, one focusing on the entire capital
account and the other based exclusively on equity markets. Given that the two measures are
highly correlated (0.74), we use them separately (Panel A and Panel B in Table 5) in our
13regressions. The capital account openness measure compiled in Quinn (1997) and Quinn and
Toyoda (2008) is based on information from the IMF. A value of one indicates full capital
account openness, a value of zero a closed capital account, and larger intermediate values
indicate increasingly fewer regulations on international capital °ows. The equity market
openness measure is based upon the ratio of the market capitalization of the S&P investable
to the S&P global indices in each country, following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock
(2003). The S&P's global stock index seeks to represent the local stock market whereas the
investable index corrects the market capitalization for foreign ownership restrictions. Hence,
a ratio of one means that all of the stocks in the local market are available to foreigners.
To measure regulatory trade openness, we use the trade liberalization dates developed in
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) (based on the earlier work of Sachs and Warner (1995)). Wacziarg
and Welch look at ¯ve criteria: high tari® rates, extensive non-tari® barriers, large black
market exchange rate premia, state monopolies on major exports, and socialist economic
systems. If a country meets any of these ¯ve criteria, it is classi¯ed with an indicator
variable equal to zero and deemed closed.
In columns I, II, and III across two panels, Table 5 reports the e®ect of capital account,
equity market and trade openness on market segmentation (intercepts are not reported).
While all coe±cients are negative, as expected, only the two ¯nancial openness e®ects are
consistently signi¯cant. Note also that capital account openness as well as equity market
openness have each higher explanatory power (in terms of R2), than trade openness. Coun-
tries with completely open capital accounts or equity markets feature yield di®erentials that
are about 250 to 300 basis points smaller than those with completely closed ¯nancial sys-
tems. Given that trade and ¯nancial openness are positively correlated, these coe±cients
decrease in joint regressions, but they remain statistically and economically signi¯cant.
In column IV, we add a trend term to the regression to explore the extent to which de
jure openness subsumes the pure time e®ect documented above. Only in the capital account
regressions is the coe±cient on the time trend reduced in magnitude indicating that some of
the time variation can be accounted for by trends in openness, but the magnitude is largely
una®ected by the inclusion of equity market openness. In both sets of regressions, the time
trend remains signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The time trend's inclusion adds only 2% to
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increase in the regression R2 over the time trend in isolation. The openness variables clearly
also explain cross-sectional di®erences in segmentation.
Finally, in column V, we also include our three control variables. As in Table 4, this
generates a sizeable increase in the regression R2, and the number of listed ¯rms and earnings
growth volatility di®erentials remain important. The inclusion of these control variables does
slightly reduce the estimated ¯nancial openness e®ects, but they remain statistically and
economically signi¯cant. A closed to open di®erence still implies a 200 to 210 basis point
di®erential in earnings yields. While retaining the expected sign, the trade openness e®ect
is now statistically insigni¯cant.
4.3 Baseline market segmentation
The de jure globalization measures jointly explain 9 to 13% of the variation in the de facto
market segmentation measure. To set a benchmark for our capacity to explain this variation,
we conduct a time-series ¯xed-e®ects regression:
SEGi;t = ®i + ¿t + ´i;t (3)
where SEGi;t is the year t measure of segmentation for country i, and ®i and ¿t represent
country and year e®ects, respectively. This baseline regression explains 42% of the total
variation in SEG.
Most of the R2 (31%) comes from the ¯xed e®ects, reported in Table 1, corroborating
the evidence that country factors are dominant and that valuation di®erentials are very
persistent. The individual country ¯xed e®ects are of interest as well. The three largest
¯xed e®ects are due to Zimbabwe, Jamaica, and C^ ote d'Ivoire. The least integrated markets,
on average, among industrialized countries are Finland, Norway, and New Zealand. The
smallest country ¯xed e®ects are due to the United States (not surprisingly), the United
Kingdom, and Australia. Finally, the pure year e®ects exhibit a signi¯cant downward trend
over the sample, consistent with the previous evidence on signi¯cant time trends. Unlike
a pure time-trend, however, valuation convergence was notably interrupted following the
151997 South-East Asian crisis and the market turbulence in 1998 (the Russian debt crisis and
LTCM) (see Figure 1).
5 Determinants of market segmentation
De jure globalization measures together with controls for earnings volatility, leverage di®er-
entials, and the number of ¯rms explain about 25% of the total panel variation in SEG,
whereas a simple country and time e®ects regression explains 42%. Here we consider a host
of other factors potentially associated with segmentation. Appendix Table 3 provides a list
of all the variables we consider and Section 5.1 provides the economic rationale for why they
are considered. We relegate a detailed description of the sources and data construction to
Appendix Table 2. Our goal is to ¯nd a parsimonious set of factors that maximizes the
explanatory power for the segmentation variable. To this end, we employ statistical model
reduction techniques, detailed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 conducts a variance decomposition
analysis on the selected models.
5.1 Other segmentation factors
We consider ¯ve categories of variables.
Measures of de facto openness
In addition to the de jure measures of ¯nancial and trade openness provided above, we also
consider two de facto measures of openness. First, we use a measure of the importance of
foreign direct investment (FDI), computed as the sum of the absolute values of in°ows and
out°ows of FDI relative to GDP. Second, we employ a traditional de facto measure of trade
openness, computed as the sum of exports and imports as a share of gross domestic product.
Political risk and institutions
There are many additional country characteristics that may e®ectively segment markets other
than formal capital or trade restrictions. La Porta et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of
investor protection and, more generally, the quality of institutions and the legal environment.
16Poor institutions and political instability may a®ect risk assessments of foreign investors
e®ectively segmenting capital markets (see Bekaert (1995)), and ¯nancial openness might
not su±ce to attract foreign capital if the country is viewed as excessively risky.
To explore these e®ects, we consider several variables that measure di®erent aspects of
the institutional environment. First, we consider several sub-indices of the ICRG political
risk index: 1) the quality of institutions, re°ecting corruption, the strength and impartiality
of the legal system (law and order), and bureaucratic quality, and 2) the investment pro¯le,
re°ecting the risk of expropriation, contract viability, payment delays, and the ability to
repatriate pro¯ts. This measure is closely associated with the attractiveness of a country
for FDI. We also separately consider the sub-index for law and order, which measures both
the quality of the legal system and whether laws are actually enforced. It is likely closely
associated with investor protection. Note that high ratings are associated with less risk.
Using Bhattacharya and Daouk's (2002) data regarding insider trading laws, we construct
two indicator variables. The ¯rst takes the value of one following the introduction of an
insider trading law and the second takes the value of one after the law's ¯rst prosecution.
Finally, we consider the country's legal origin (Anglo-Saxon, French, and other), an often
used instrument for corporate governance and a \good" legal system.
Financial development
Poorly developed ¯nancial systems may also be an important factor driving market segmen-
tation. For example, in a 1992 survey by Chuhan, equity market illiquidity was mentioned
as one of the main reasons that prevented foreign institutional investors from investing in
emerging markets. Moreover, poor liquidity as a priced local factor may lead to valuation
di®erentials. When markets are closed, e±cient capital allocation should depend on ¯nan-
cial development (see Wurgler (2000) and Fisman and Love (2004)). Because banks are still
the dominant ¯nancing source in many countries, poor banking sector development may
severely hamper growth prospects and lower valuations. We employ several measures to
quantify stock and banking sector development.
Our ¯rst equity market liquidity measure relies on the incidence of observed zero daily
returns, following the work of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), Lesmond (2005), and
17Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007). Our other measures of equity market trading and
e±ciency include: (i) turnover as the value traded relative to GDP, a standard measure of
stock market development (see Atje and Jovanovic (1989)); (ii) the size of the equity market
as measured by total market capitalization relative to GDP; and (iii) equity market syn-
chronicity (see Morck, Yeung, and Yu (MYY henceforth) (2000)), computed as an annual
value-weighted local market model R2 obtained from each ¯rm's returns regressed on the lo-
cal market portfolio return for that year. Last, we proxy for the development of the banking
system by the amount of private credit divided by GDP (see King and Levine (1993)).13
Risk appetite and business cycles
We also consider a number of variables that capture potential push factors driving capital
°ows. Given that all these variables are based on U.S. or global data, they exhibit only
time-series variation. An established literature argues that market conditions in developed
countries, such as the level of interest rates, may drive capital °ows, and thus a®ect inter-
national valuation di®erentials (see e.g. Fernandez-Arias (1996)). In particular, low real
rates in developed markets would cause capital to °ow into emerging markets bringing their
valuations closer to developed market levels. While the evidence on this e®ect is mixed (see
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002)), we nonetheless try to capture it using the level of
the real interest rate across G-7 countries.
While the real rate e®ect may re°ect a behavioral search for yield, it is also possible
that the level of interest rates is correlated with a change in risk appetite. Risk averse
investors may view foreign markets (erroneously) as risky. However, real interest rates have
an ambiguous e®ect on risk aversion. Lower interest rates may increase wealth, and thus
increase risk tolerance (see e.g. Sharpe (1990)). Alternatively, if pro-cyclical, low interest
rates may be associated with recessions, and therefore with an increase in societal risk
13Unfortunately, we lack su±cient data for accounting standards: the earnings levels employed in the price-
earnings ratios may exhibit systematic di®erences due to country-speci¯c accounting rules and any perceived
risks associated with lax accounting standards or the opacity of corporate records may a®ect the cost of
capital across countries (see Hail and Leuz (2006)). However, it is likely that the development measures we
do have are highly correlated with accounting quality measures.
18aversion. We consequently also include a more direct measure of U.S. risk aversion due
to Bekaert and Engstrom (2008) computed based on the parameter estimates of the habit
model in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). This measure tends to behave counter-cyclically.
Finally, low real rates may be an indicator of lax monetary policy and a surge in \global
liquidity." Popular stories claim such global liquidity increases stock market valuations across
the world. As an alternative global liquidity measure, we use the growth rate of the U.S.
money supply (M2). We also include world GDP growth, which may act as an indicator of
the world business cycle. To the extent the world business cycle a®ects global discount rates
and growth opportunities, it may not a®ect segmentation levels under the null of integration,
but it would cause variation in segmentation levels for these markets that are segmented.
Moreover, if correlated with global risk appetites, international business cycle indicators may
be associated with changes in international capital °ows and a®ect overall segmentation.
Other measures more directly correlated with the risk appetite or sentiments of world
investors are the U.S. corporate bond spread and the VIX option volatility index. The latter
is generally viewed as an indicator of market uncertainty and sudden increases in its level
with a °ight to safety. Increases in these measures may lead to a retreat of U.S. capital
from foreign markets, leading to divergence in valuations. Alternatively, the VIX index is
simply a measure of the U.S. stock market's volatility, which may proxy for U.S. earnings
growth and discount rate volatility. We also investigate one country-speci¯c factor, the level
of the lagged country portfolio return over the last year to potentially proxy for return chas-
ing e®ects by international investors. Finally, we include a measure of world equity market
volatility.
Growth determinants
Under the null of integration, a country's growth opportunities should be re°ected in the
global valuation measure of its industry basket. However, it is conceivable, especially for
developing countries, that growth prospects are more local in nature. Following the extensive
work on growth determinants (see, e.g., Barro (1997)), we therefore include several measures
related to cross-country expected growth di®erentials: the initial level of per capita GDP,
the percentage of secondary school enrollment as a measure of human capital, the log of life
19expectancy, and population growth.
5.2 Multivariate analysis: Model selection and results
Our goal is to ¯nd a parsimonious set of factors that best explain the variation in SEG. With
a large number of highly correlated explanatory variables, this is no easy task. The procedure
we employ is the general-to-speci¯c search algorithm (see Hendry (1995) and Hendry and
Krolzig (2001)) implemented, for example, in PcGets to automatically select the \optimal"
model. The algorithm constitutes a \testing down" process that eliminates variables with
coe±cient estimates that are not statistically signi¯cant leading to a parsimonious undom-
inated model. In particular, in a ¯rst step we estimate a general unrestricted model that
contains all available variables by OLS. We then eliminate variables that are statistically
insigni¯cant. The new model is then re-estimated, and a multiple reduction path search
is used to ¯nd all terminal models, that is models in which all variables have statistically
signi¯cant coe±cient estimates. Finally, if more than one terminal model exists, the di®erent
terminal models are compared to each other and one is chosen as the unique ¯nal model.
We initially consider the various candidate variables mentioned above for which we have
data over the full sample of 50 countries. In addition, we augment the candidate factors
with the three control variables, leverage, earnings volatility, and the number of listed ¯rms
suggested by our U.S. case study, and with a time trend. In all speci¯cations, we impose
the inclusion of a constant as well as equity market and trade sector openness given their
documented primacy and theoretical justi¯cation.14 Appendix Table 3 lists the candidate
variables that enter into the algorithm as well as those that survive.
We employ two main speci¯cations di®erentiated by the inclusion of either the equity
market or capital account openness variables. In the ¯rst case, we eliminate 19 variables,
leaving us with a ¯nal model that contains 9 variables. When we apply the procedure re-
placing equity market openness with capital account openness, we retain 10 variables which
overlap greatly with the equity market openness speci¯cation. Note that we lose some obser-
14If we do not impose their inclusion, equity market openness survives the speci¯cation reduction, whereas
trade sector openness does not.
20vations to do so as Quinn's capital account openness data are limited. While the algorithm
is entirely statistical in nature and not guided by theory (other than our inclusion of de jure
globalization), we view a model that has roughly 10 variables to be quite reasonable given
the large number of plausible determinants at the outset.
Statistical Signi¯cance
Table 6 provides the ¯nal regression speci¯cations for the retained models. We ¯rst focus on
the main equity market openness speci¯cation presented in column 1. While equity market
openness has a robustly signi¯cant e®ect on segmentation, the trade openness variable is
not signi¯cant. Other surviving variables include the ICRG's Investment Pro¯le, for which
improvements are associated with signi¯cant reductions in market segmentation, the size of
the equity market, which has the expected sign, but is only borderline statistically signi¯cant,
global economic growth, and two additional \global risk" variables, the U.S. corporate bond
spread and the VIX volatility index (with the expected positive signs and signi¯cance).
Earnings growth volatility and the number of ¯rms also survive the selection, and both
retain the signs and statistical signi¯cance documented above. Note that the pure time
trend does not survive the model selection methodology, suggesting that our explanatory
factors are rich enough to capture the pure time trend in observed market segmentation.
It is possible that the documented e®ects for each variable change dramatically in the
presence of alternative explanatory variables sets. To address this criticism, we provide
a con¯dence interval for each entry beneath the estimates in brackets recognizing the po-
tential mis-speci¯cation of our preferred multivariate regression using the model reduction
techniques discussed above. The con¯dence intervals are constructed using a jackknife exper-
iment where, for each surviving variable separately, we randomly sample from the 27 other
possible variables (see Appendix Table 3) for which we have full sample data. The number of
additional variables and their identities are completely random, but we force the selection to
have between 8 and 27 additional variables. For each set of randomly selected explanatory
variables, we perform a regression with SEG as the dependent variable, throw out variables
with t-statistics below 1, and perform a second regression on the remaining set. We retain
the regression coe±cient and the overall contribution that the particular variable makes for
21predicted segmentation. We iterate this procedure 1,000 times for each variable separately
to construct a con¯dence interval. The 5 and 95% percentiles are presented. Most of the
main variables highlighted above, including de jure openness, continue to be signi¯cant with
the exceptions of world GDP growth and the VIX option volatility index. Interestingly, the
regression analysis seems to understate the role for MCAP/GDP and the number of ¯rms,
where the estimated coe±cient is near the upper bound of the con¯dence interval.
Overall, it appears that de facto segmentation is driven by three types of factors: de jure
globalization (with Investment Pro¯le being correlated with a regulatory climate conducive to
FDI), ¯nancial market development (market capitalization to GDP), and measures correlated
with global risk premia and appetites. The speci¯cation using capital account openness,
presented in column 3, con¯rms this general picture. The signi¯cant variables include capital
account openness, investment pro¯le, local market capitalization to GDP, and again the
corporate bond spread and the VIX index. The only puzzling result is the signi¯cantly
positive association between SEG and U.S. money supply growth. The latter is often viewed,
as an indicator of global liquidity, so we would expect it to be negatively associated with
segmentation but the coe±cient is positive. It is of course conceivable that monetary policy
reacts to tight conditions in ¯nancial markets (as proxied by high corporate bond spread
and VIX index levels) by providing liquidity to the markets. The jackknife analysis con¯rms
that trade openness is not a signi¯cant determinant, and suggests that the importance of
the VIX index may be exaggerated by the ¯nal speci¯cation.
In the remaining columns (columns 2 and 4) of Table 6 we consider slightly shorter sam-
ples which allow the inclusion of explanatory variables focusing on stock market e±ciency and
liquidity. In the equity market speci¯cation (column 2), the illiquidity measure survives but
is not signi¯cant at conventional levels; the MYY measure of stock market ine±ciency also
survives and is signi¯cant under the Prais Winsten standard errors. Both variables have the
expected signs. The role for de jure equity market openness is somewhat reduced; however,
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) document that the process towards equity market
openness itself directly a®ects the local trading environment, so we may in fact be capturing
a channel through which ¯nancial openness operates. That said, neither stock market vari-
able survives in the capital account openness speci¯cation (column 4), and general capital
22account openness retains the same magnitude and signi¯cance. It is also conceivable that
the e®ects of stock market development and e±ciency are well captured by the MCAP/GDP
and number of ¯rms variables.
Economic Signi¯cance
The signs and signi¯cance of the preferred multivariate speci¯cations are fairly straight-
forward to interpret, but the results do not provide clear guidance on which factors are
relatively more important in explaining market segmentation. For our two main multivari-
ate regressions from Table 6, we conduct two experiments to reveal the economic importance
of the factors, both reported in Table 7. For both panels (equity market and capital account
openness), we report the change in the segmentation level when the independent variable
moves from the average value of an emerging to the average value of a developed market.
For the time series variables, we simply consider the response to a one standard deviation
change in the independent variable. The most important determinants for the equity open-
ness regression are equity openness and the U.S. Corporate Bond Spread. Trade openness,
MCAP/GDP and the number of ¯rms are least important. For the capital account regres-
sion, the story is virtually identical, with Legal Origin, in addition to the three variables
mentioned above, being relatively less important.
In a second experiment, we examine how much of the variation in the segmentation
variable is explained by the right-hand side explanatory variables and what is the relative
contribution of each. We use a simple R2 concept computed as
V ar( ^ SEGi;t)
V ar(SEGi;t) where ^ SEGi;t =
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t=1 ^ SEGi;t. These quantities were already reported in Table 6.
Across the regression speci¯cations provided, the predicted market segmentation explains
23about 30% of the variation of the observed market segmentation in the data. That is,
relative to our exploratory regression including only country and year ¯xed e®ects discussed
above (with an R2 around 40%), we explain about three-fourths of our benchmark.
To examine the contributions of each of the independent variables to the overall vari-
ation of the predicted market segmentation, we compute the following covariance for each
explanatory variable j:









^ ¯j( ^ SEGi;t ¡ ¹ ^ SEG)(xi;j;t ¡ ¹ xj) (6)
where ¹ xj is de¯ned analogously as above. Summed across all individual explanatory variables,
these covariance terms must exactly equal the variance of the predicted market segmentation.
In Table 7, we report the ratio of each covariance term to the overall predicted market
segmentation variance,
Cov( ^ SEGi;t;^ ¯jxi;j;t)
V ar( ^ SEGi;t) , where each column must necessarily sum to 1. We
report this variance decomposition for the two main regression speci¯cations.
In the main equity market openness speci¯cation (see Panel A), the largest contributors
to the overall variation in the predicted market segmentation are equity market openness
(around 20%), the investment pro¯le (around 15%), the two control variables (collectively
around 35%), and the U.S. corporate default spread (14%). The contribution from de jure
trade openness is relatively small. Panel B provides comparable evidence for the main
capital account openness speci¯cation. The general magnitudes are comparable, although
the explanatory contribution from general capital account openness is somewhat smaller
at around 12%. The jackknife analysis again con¯rms that the stock market development
variables (both MCAP/GDP and number of ¯rms) are perhaps more important than the
¯nal regression point estimates indicate. Again, the VIX, and World GDP growth may be
spurious factors. The increased importance of MCAP/GDP remains true when investigating
the jackknife results for the capital account openness speci¯cation. Trade openness and
the VIX also do not appear to generate robustly signi¯cant contributions to the explained
variance of SEG.
It is also important to note that this measure of predicted segmentation variation cap-
tures both time-series and cross-sectional e®ects. We further perform two decompositions
of these covariance terms into separate e®ects that capture each of these features. The
24¯rst decomposition splits the total covariation for each explanatory variable into a within-
country component and a pure cross-sectional between-country component. The second
decomposition splits the total covariation into a within-year component and a pure time-
series between-year component. We describe the formulas for these calculations in Appendix
C.
Table 7 reports both decompositions. All covariance terms are again scaled by the vari-
ance of the predicted degree of segmentation, V ar( ^ SEGi;t). Both decompositions suggest
that the largest contribution to the variation in predicted market segmentation is the cross-
sectional component, the between-country component in the case of the ¯rst decomposition
(accounting for around 58% of the explained variation) and the within-year component in
the case of the second decomposition (accounting for 82%). The temporal variation is mostly
accounted for by the global factors, but temporal variation in openness, the investment pro-
¯le, and MCAP/GDP also contribute. Taken together, regulatory globalization is clearly an
important determinant of observed market segmentation. That is perhaps not surprising;
however, it is important again to reemphasize the distinction between our measures of de
jure regulatory openness and our new price-based measure of de facto segmentation. Fur-
ther, it is important to note that, beyond regulatory openness, the ¯nancial and institutional
conditions within which these market and economies operate are important determinants of
de facto market segmentation.
6 Robustness Checks
Finally, we brie°y summarize several robustness checks. Detailed results are available upon
request.
U.S. as a benchmark
Using the world market as a benchmark to compare valuation levels has the disadvantage
that the number of countries in the index and their relative weights change over time. There-
fore, we repeat all of our empirical exercises using the U.S. stock market, the world's largest,
as the benchmark. To do this, we drop the U.S. from the list of countries to investigate. Our
25results are robust to this change in benchmark. For example, all the coe±cients for the four
speci¯cations reported in Table 6 are largely unchanged when the U.S. benchmark is used
and have similar statistical signi¯cance levels.
Equally-weighted industry di®erentials
As we indicated before, the industry mix of a country may a®ect its segmentation level.
To more cleanly focus on country regulations, we investigate an alternative SEG measure
where we employ equal weights for the various industries within each country. The results
presented in Table 6 are also largely unchanged under this alternative weighting scheme.
Interaction e®ects
Finally, the e®ect of a number of our explanatory variables may themselves be a function of
the de jure openness of the country. For example, it is conceivable that ¯nancial development
only contributes to valuation convergence in ¯nancially open markets. Therefore, we inves-
tigate the role for interaction e®ects with equity market openness for all the variables in the
main speci¯cation from column 1 in Table 6. We examine these e®ects one-by-one to prevent
the proliferation of the independent variables. Only two of the variables, MCAP/GDP and
local market illiquidity, exhibit a signi¯cant interaction e®ect; for the most part, interaction
e®ects are not statistically signi¯cant.
Information variables
A rather extensive literature on home bias (see especially Portes and Rey (2006)) shows that
informational frictions play a large role in determining international transactions in ¯nancial
assets and the level of home bias. To the extent that there is a link between home bias and
asset transactions and valuation, such measures may help determine segmentation levels. We
therefore also include several proxies for the degree to which countries are connected with
the world through telecommunication. In particular, we include the number of ¯xed line
and mobile phone subscribers per 100 people, the number of Internet users per 100 people,
and the international voice tra±c as measured by minutes per person. Because the latter
measure is not available for all observations in our sample, we applied the model reduction
26process to a sample that is slightly smaller than the one considered in Section 5. Neither
of these information variables survive the robustness process; hence information asymmetry
seems not to play a critical role in driving segmentation levels.
7 Conclusions
We study the evolution of market segmentation. Our measure of market segmentation, SEG,
the absolute di®erential between local and global valuation ratios, will shrink as discount
rates and growth opportunities become global in nature.
While it is well known that the forces of globalization have reduced market segmenta-
tion over the past few decades, it is di±cult to quantify the magnitude, the timing, and
the sources of this reduction. Our measure allows us to characterize both the time-series
and cross-country variation in observed segmentation. We ¯nd that segmentation has sig-
ni¯cantly trended downward through time for both developed and emerging markets, where
developed markets are now e®ectively integrated. De jure globalization, such as the open-
ness of equity market to foreign investors, plays a pivotal role in explaining cross-country
di®erences in market segmentation, but so does the institutional environment and local ¯-
nancial market development. Variables re°ecting global risk conditions, such as the U.S.
corporate bond spread, also account for a signi¯cant proportion of SEG's variation. These
variables alongside de jure openness explain about 30% of the variation in segmentation. We
¯nd equity market openness to be the single most important economic explanatory variable,
accounting for the largest share of the explained segmentation variance.
Finally, since our segmentation measure employs a country's industrial structure as a
key building block, we also explore market segmentation at the industry level. We ¯nd
that historically heavily regulated industries, such as the banking, insurance, and electricity
sectors, were among the least integrated early in our sample and are now among the most
integrated.
Much of the literature has focused on equity returns, for example examining return corre-
lations (see Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2007) and the references therein), or the evolution
of betas with respect to a global benchmark (see Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Baele
27(2005), among others). While these approaches have sometimes led to the conclusion that
integration has signi¯cant e®ects on returns, the tests often lack statistical signi¯cance. Our
method to examine the e®ects of globalization on market integration o®ers an alternative and
perhaps more powerful perspective. Our analysis allows us to answer the important questions
of why one country is more segmented than another and why the degree of segmentation
changes over time.
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A: A simple pricing model for industry portfolios
We begin by de¯ning real log earnings growth, ¢ln(Earnt), with Earni;j;t the earnings
level, in country i, industry j as:
¢ln(Earni;j;t) = GOw;j;t¡1 + GOi;j;t¡1 + ²i;j;t: (7)
GOw;j;t represents the world-wide stochastic growth opportunity for each industry j which
does not depend on the country to which the industry belongs. In contrast, GOi;j;t is a
country and industry speci¯c growth opportunity. For example, an industry's growth oppor-
tunity may be curtailed by country-speci¯c regulation or a®ected by country-speci¯c factor
endowments. Finally, ²i;j;t is a country and industry speci¯c earnings growth disturbance,
which we assume to be N(0;¾2
i;j). Because it has no persistence, it is not priced. Growth
opportunities themselves follow persistent stochastic processes:
GOw;j;t = ¹j + 'jGOw;j;t¡1 + ²w;j;t (8)
GOi;j;t = ¹ ¹i;j + ¹ 'ijGOi;j;t¡1 + ¹ ²i;j;t:
We assume ²w;j;t » N(0;¾2
w;j) and ¹ ²i;j;t » N(0; ¹ ¾2
i;j).
The real discount rate for each industry in each country is a®ected by two factors:
±i;j;t = rf(1 ¡ ¯i;j ¡ ¹ ¯i;j) + ¯i;j±w;t + ¹ ¯i;j±i;t: (9)
The constant term, with rf equal to the world risk free rate, arises because the discount
rates are total not excess discount rates. The world market discount rate process follows:
±w;t = dw + Áw±w;t¡1 + ´w;t; (10)
with ´w;t » N(0;s2
w). Likewise, the country-speci¯c discount factor follows:
±i;t = di + Ái±i;t¡1 + ´i;t; (11)
with ´i;t » N(0;s2
i). We assume the various shocks to be uncorrelated.
29Assuming that each industry pays out all earnings, Earnt, each period, the valuation of








Given that we model earnings growth as in equation (7), the earnings process is non-
stationary. We must scale the current valuation by earnings, and impose a transversality
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Given the assumed dynamics for ±w, ±i, GOw;j, and GOi;j and normally distributed
shocks, the PE ratio can be shown to be an in¯nite sum of exponentiated a±ne functions
of the current realizations of the growth opportunity factors (with a positive sign) and the




exp(ai;j;k + bi;j;k±w;t + ci;j;kGOw;j;t + ei;j;k±i;t + fi;j;kGOi;j;t): (14)
In this model, the cash °ows and discount rate processes governing the pricing of various
industries in particular countries may be a®ected by both local and global factors. Note
that the constant in the expression for the PE ratio is a®ected positively by the volatility
of the shocks to the discount rates, growth opportunities, and earnings growth rates. This
dependence may lead to local variables a®ecting the dependence of the earnings yield on
global variables because of non-linearity in the model, but this dependence is likely second-
order.
The model nests the two polar cases of full integration and full segmentation. Assume
that the variance of the country-speci¯c growth opportunity is zero and ¹ ¯i;j = 0 8 i;j. Also,
assume that industry systematic risk is the same across integrated countries; that is,
¯i;j = ¯j: (15)
This assumption also implies that ¯nancial risk through leverage is identical across countries.




exp(ai;j;k + bj;k±w;t + cj;kGOw;j;t): (16)
30An improvement in growth opportunities increases price earnings ratios for the industry
everywhere in the world, and the change in the PE ratio is larger when GOw;j;t is more
persistent. Similarly, a reduction in the world discount rate increases the PE ratio with
the magnitude of the response depending upon the persistence of the discount rate process
and the beta of the industry. Critically, the coe±cients on ±w;t and GOw;j;t are not country-
speci¯c. Under these assumptions, valuation ratios for the same industry across countries
do not need to be strictly identical, but this di®erence only depends on the constant ai;j;k.
Alternatively, if ¯i;j = 0 8 i;j, that is local investors determine discount rates and GOw;j;t
has zero variance, country-speci¯c persistent components will drive local industry growth op-
portunities and discount rates. In that case, local industry PE ratios need not be tied to
global ratios for the same industry and price earnings ratios for each local industry depend
only on ±i;t and GOi;j;t. While local and global factors may be correlated, local industry PE
ratios can now di®er substantially from comparable global PE ratios.
B: Constructing 100 random samples of 50 \countries" from U.S. data
We use the sample of 4,594 U.S.¯rms to construct 100 random samples, each of which re-
sembles our actual data set of 50 countries with respect to the approximate number of ¯rms
used.15 In particular, we allow for cases where a \country" contains 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60,
100, 150, 200, 250, 350, 500, or 1,000 ¯rms. We start by de¯ning country i = 1 and randomly
selecting 10 U.S. ¯rms. We then add another 10 randomly selected ¯rms, then another 10
¯rms and so on until we have randomly selected 1,000 U.S. ¯rms. We repeat this process a
100 times, obtaining 100 \countries" i = 1;2;3:::;100 each with 10, 20, 30,..., 1,000 randomly
selected ¯rms. We then randomly select 50 out of the 100 \countries" and associate them
with the 50 countries present in our actual international data set. For example, Argentina
could be associated with i = 5, Australia with i = 43 and so on. We then choose the number
of randomly selected ¯rms that is approximately equal to the number of ¯rms present in
15We know the exact number of ¯rms used in a given year for countries for which we use EMDB data, we
only know the approximate number of ¯rms used by Datastream in 2006. For countries for which we obtain
data from Datastream, we assume that the number of ¯rms used until 1989 is about half (but not less than
50) of the 2006 number of ¯rms and is at the 2006 levels from 1990 onwards.
31the actual data. Assume for example that we have 13 ¯rms for Argentina in 1994 and 24 in
1995, we would work with the 10 randomly selected U.S. ¯rms for i = 5 in 1994 and with the
20 randomly selected U.S. ¯rms for i = 5 in 1995 and so on. Finally, we repeat this random
selection process 100 times, obtaining 100 data sets that approximate our actual data sets
with respect to the number of ¯rms used in a given year and country. In each case, we
proceed exactly as described in Section 3 to calculate a \country's" degree of segmentation,
that is we ¯rst aggregate earnings yields across ¯rms in the same industry and take absolute
di®erences with respect to the corresponding U.S. earnings yield for the given industry and
then aggregate this absolute di®erence across industries in a given country using industry
market values as weights.
C: Variance Decomposition
We conduct two variance decompositions to isolate the time-series and cross-sectional e®ects
of each explanatory variables for predicted segmentation. The ¯rst decomposition splits the
total covariation for each explanatory variable into a within-country component and a pure
cross-sectional between-country component:















^ ¯j( ¹ ^ SEGi ¡ ¹ ^ SEG)(¹ xi;j ¡ ¹ xj) (17)
where ¹ ^ SEGi = 1
Ti
PTi
t=1 ^ SEGi;t and ¹ xi;j = 1
Ti
PTi
t=1 xi;j;t denote the within-country means of
the relevant variables.
The second decomposition splits the total covariation into a within-year component and
a pure time-series between-year component:















^ ¯j( ¹ ^ SEGt ¡ ¹ ^ SEG)(¹ xj;t ¡ ¹ xj) (18)
where ¹ ^ SEGt = 1
N
PN
i=1 ^ SEGi;t and ¹ xj;t = 1
N
PN
i=1 xi;j;t denote the within-year cross-country
means of the relevant variables.
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Country Sample Average St. Dev.





















(* as of 2006)
ARG EM 5.3% 5.2% 1988 9.5% 4.9% -48.4% 8 8.1% 26
AUS DEV 1.9% 1.2% 1980 3.7% 1.2% -68.5% 48 4.0% 160*
AUT DEV 2.4% 0.7% 1980 2.4% 2.7% 11.1% 24 4.5% 50*
BEL DEV 2.7% 1.7% 1980 4.5% 2.0% -55.4% 39 4.8% 90*
BGD EM 6.4% 2.2% 1998 7.6% 5.9% -22.4% 6 9.5% 49
BRA EM 6.1% 4.3% 1988 10.1% 4.8% -52.4% 9 8.9% 74
CAN DEV 2.3% 1.1% 1980 3.8% 1.7% -54.6% 44 4.4% 250*
CHE DEV 2.1% 1.4% 1980 4.5% 1.3% -70.8% 46 4.2% 150*
CHL EM 2.7% 1.9% 1989 3.8% 2.5% -35.5% 28 5.6% 41
CHN EM 2.3% 1.0% 1995 2.6% 2.1% -18.1% 38 5.5% 215
CIV EM 7.0% 1.9% 1998 7.6% 6.7% -11.9% 2 10.0% 12
COL EM 4.5% 3.0% 1986 7.4% 3.1% -58.8% 18 7.1% 20
DEU DEV 2.1% 1.0% 1980 3.2% 2.4% -25.7% 29 4.3% 250*
DNK DEV 3.5% 2.6% 1980 6.5% 1.3% -80.6% 47 5.6% 50*
EGY EM 6.0% 2.8% 1998 7.5% 6.1% -18.4% 4 9.1% 51
ESP DEV 2.0% 1.0% 1989 3.1% 1.5% -52.2% 45 5.0% 120*
FIN DEV 4.1% 2.9% 1990 7.3% 2.2% -69.2% 35 7.2% 50*
FRA DEV 2.4% 1.2% 1980 4.1% 2.0% -51.9% 40 4.5% 250*
GBR DEV 1.9% 1.2% 1980 4.2% 1.2% -72.8% 49 4.0% 550*
GRC EM 3.1% 2.0% 1991 4.5% 2.7% -39.7% 22 6.3% 50*
IDN EM 3.7% 1.4% 1991 2.8% 4.4% 57.5% 10 6.8% 57
IND EM 3.2% 1.4% 1988 3.2% 2.7% -13.8% 23 6.0% 100
IRL DEV 2.7% 2.0% 1980 5.4% 1.7% -67.8% 43 4.8% 50*
ISR EM 2.3% 0.6% 1999 2.4% 2.2% -7.4% 36 5.5% 50
ITA DEV 2.2% 0.5% 1988 2.5% 1.9% -23.9% 42 5.0% 160*
JAM EM 8.7% 5.9% 1998 11.8% 5.1% -56.7% 7 11.7% 19
JOR EM 2.6% 1.6% 1988 3.1% 2.9% -8.5% 21 5.4% 31
KEN EM 5.3% 2.8% 1998 6.9% 4.1% -40.0% 11 8.3% 18
KOR EM 3.6% 1.6% 1988 4.0% 3.6% -11.0% 14 6.4% 123
LKA EM 6.1% 4.3% 1995 6.9% 3.4% -50.5% 15 9.3% 40
MAR EM 2.7% 1.1% 1998 2.9% 3.1% 4.6% 19 5.8% 11
MEX EM 3.5% 3.6% 1988 5.8% 2.3% -61.0% 34 6.3% 58
MYS EM 3.1% 0.8% 1986 3.9% 2.4% -38.7% 30 5.7% 92
NGA EM 6.2% 3.7% 1986 11.1% 2.2% -80.1% 37 8.8% 25
NLD DEV 2.6% 1.3% 1980 4.2% 2.6% -38.5% 25 4.7% 130*
NOR DEV 5.6% 4.2% 1982 11.3% 3.4% -70.0% 16 8.0% 50*
NZL DEV 2.9% 1.4% 1990 2.7% 2.5% -7.0% 27 6.0% 50*
PAK EM 5.4% 5.2% 1988 4.3% 6.5% 50.4% 3 8.2% 51
PHL EM 2.9% 0.9% 1990 3.4% 2.5% -26.0% 26 6.0% 43
PRT EM 2.2% 0.9% 1990 2.5% 2.3% -8.9% 33 5.2% 50*
SGP DEV 3.7% 2.5% 1980 8.2% 2.3% -71.7% 32 5.8% 100*
SWE DEV 2.8% 1.2% 1984 2.6% 2.4% -10.0% 31 5.3% 70*
THA EM 3.8% 1.8% 1988 2.7% 3.8% 39.9% 12 6.6% 56
TTO EM 1.7% 0.6% 1998 1.6% 1.9% 16.6% 41 4.8% 11
TUN EM 3.8% 1.5% 1998 4.6% 3.6% -21.0% 13 6.8% 17
TUR EM 3.8% 1.9% 1989 4.5% 3.1% -32.0% 17 6.8% 41
USA DEV 0.7% 0.2% 1980 0.6% 0.8% 23.6% 50 2.8% 1,000*
VEN EM 6.8% 4.8% 1988 6.4% 10.0% 55.0% 1 9.6% 15
ZAF EM 2.6% 1.2% 1980 3.5% 2.9% -18.9% 20 4.7% 70*
ZWE EM 10.3% 10.0% 1988 19.2% 6.0% -68.6% 5 13.1% 22
Averages of country-level data
DEV 2.7% 1.5% 1982 4.5% 1.9% -45.0% 37 5.0%
EM 4.4% 2.6% 1991 5.8% 3.9% -20.1% 18 7.3%
ALL 3.8% 2.2% 1988 5.3% 3.1% -29.6% 6.4%
Dispersion of country-level data
DEV 1.0% 1.0% 3.86 2.4% 0.7% 31.1% 1.2%
EM 2.1% 2.0% 5.10 3.7% 1.8% 35.4% 2.1%
ALL 1.9% 1.8% 6.41 3.3% 1.8% 35.6% 2.1%
Segmentation Segmentation over time
The sample includes 19 developed (DEV) and 31 emerging-market (EM) countries detailed in Appendix Table 1. For each country, we report the time-series 
average and standard deviation of the annual (end of December) segmentation measure SEG. We also compare the average segmentation between 1980 and 1984 
(or over the first five years for which segmentation data are available) to the average segmentation between 2001 and 2005, indicating the relative change in 
segmentation over time for each country as well as a country’s segmentation rank based on the measured segmentation between 2001 and 2005. A rank of one 
indicates the highest degree of segmentation. Ranks one through five and 46 through 50 appear in bold. We regress the annual segmentation measure onto a set 
of country and year dummies and report the estimated fixed effect for each country. The last column reports for each country the number of firms used in the 
construction of SEG.  For countries with data from Standard & Poors' Emerging Market Data Base (EMDB), we report the average number of firms over the 
sample period, for countries with data from Datastream, we only have the approximate number of firms Datastream used in 2006 to calculate country-specific 
indices. At the bottom of Table 1, we report the cross-sectional average and standard deviation of the country-level statistics reported in the upper part of the 
table. Table 2


























Aerospace & Defense 3.0% 2.6% 3.4% 2.5% -25.7% 26 37 3.7%
Automobiles & Parts 5.0% 1.6% 6.4% 4.9% -24.0% 6 5 5.8%
Banks 5.2% 2.4% 8.9% 3.0% -66.3% 1 33 5.9%
Beverages 3.5% 1.5% 4.4% 3.5% -20.3% 20 27 4.2%
Chemicals 4.1% 1.6% 4.8% 3.9% -18.0% 14 15 4.8%
Construction & Materials 3.6% 1.1% 4.4% 3.9% -11.5% 19 16 4.4%
Electricity 3.9% 1.7% 6.1% 3.5% -42.7% 8 25 4.7%
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 3.1% 1.1% 2.6% 3.2% 22.3% 36 31 3.8%
Equity Investment Instruments 4.5% 1.7% 4.4% 4.8% 9.2% 18 6 5.2%
Food & Drug Retailers 3.0% 1.3% 4.8% 2.8% -41.9% 12 36 3.7%
Food Producers 3.4% 1.2% 3.5% 4.0% 12.2% 25 14 4.1%
Forestry & Paper 5.7% 2.2% 4.6% 6.1% 32.3% 15 1 6.4%
General Financial 4.6% 1.8% 3.2% 4.4% 36.8% 27 9 5.3%
General Industrials 4.0% 1.4% 4.3% 4.0% -7.6% 21 13 4.8%
General Retailers 4.4% 2.8% 8.2% 4.1% -50.4% 3 11 5.1%
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 2.6% 1.0% 2.9% 3.7% 28.3% 32 22 3.3%
Healthcare Equipment & Services 3.2% 1.6% 3.1% 3.8% 21.8% 28 19 3.9%
Household Goods 3.7% 1.7% 2.8% 3.8% 35.6% 33 17 4.4%
Industrial Engineering 4.0% 1.7% 6.2% 3.8% -39.6% 7 20 4.7%
Industrial Metals 5.9% 1.8% 6.9% 5.4% -20.8% 526.7%
Industrial Transportation 4.1% 1.5% 5.2% 4.5% -13.4% 10 8 4.8%
Leisure Goods 4.6% 2.2% 4.4% 4.1% -7.1% 17 10 5.3%
Life Insurance 5.1% 3.2% 8.5% 2.9% -65.7% 23 45.8%
Media 3.0% 1.7% 4.8% 3.1% -35.4% 13 32 3.7%
Mining 5.1% 2.1% 3.9% 5.2% 31.4% 23 4 5.8%
Nonlife Insurance 4.8% 2.0% 7.3% 4.1% -44.8% 4 12 5.5%
Oil Equipment & Services 3.3% 1.7% 3.8% 3.7% -3.6% 24 24 4.0%
Oil & Gas Producers 4.2% 1.3% 5.1% 3.7% -28.5% 11 23 4.9%
Personal Goods 4.5% 2.4% 2.2% 4.7% 117.8% 37 7 5.3%
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 3.0% 1.2% 3.0% 3.5% 16.1% 31 26 3.7%
Real Estate 3.6% 1.2% 4.1% 3.7% -10.6% 22 21 4.3%
Software & Computer Services 2.7% 1.6% 2.8% 1.9% -33.2% 34 38 3.4%
Support Services 3.0% 1.8% 3.0% 3.2% 6.7% 29 30 3.8%
Technology Hardware & Equipment 3.2% 1.3% 1.7% 3.3% 95.5% 38 29 3.9%
Fixed Line Telecommunications 3.5% 1.6% 5.3% 3.8% -28.1% 9 18 4.3%
Mobile Telecommunications 2.8% 1.1% 4.5% 2.8% -37.7% 16 35 3.6%
Tobacco 3.7% 1.5% 3.0% 3.4% 11.4% 30 28 4.4%
Travel & Leisure 4.0% 1.9% 2.8% 5.4% 92.4% 35 3 4.8%
Average of industry-level data 3.9% 1.7% 4.5% 3.8% -2.8% 4.6%
Dispersion of industry-level data 0.9% 0.5% 1.8% 0.9% 41.9% 0.9%
Rank Segmentation Segmentation over time
For each of the 38 industries in our sample, we report the time-series average and standard deviation of the annual (end of December) industry 
segmentation. Industry segmentation is measured as the equally weighted cross-sectional average of the absolute difference between a country-specific 
industry valuation and the corresponding global industry valuation. We also compare the average industry segmentation between 1980 and 1984 to the 
average segmentation between 2001 and 2005, indicating the relative change in segmentation over time for each industry as well as an industry’s 
segmentation rank 1980 and 1984 and between 2001 and 2005. A rank of one indicates the highest degree of segmentation. Ranks one through five and 
34 through 38 appear in bold.   We regress the annual segmentation measure onto a set of industry and year dummies and report the estimated fixed effect 
for each industry.  At the bottom of Table 2, we report the cross-sectional average and standard deviation of the industry-level statistics reported in the 
upper part of the table. Table 3
Segmentation for the U.S. Benchmark
100 Random Samples of 50 "Countries" 
1973 - 2006
Distribution of coefficient estimates 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th
Trend x 100 -0.0208 -0.0190 -0.0132 -0.0081 -0.0070
Number of Public Firms (log) -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0020
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - US|) 0.0033 0.0052 0.0220 0.0407 0.0427
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - US|) 0.0027 0.0036 0.0068 0.0108 0.0121
Distribution of t- stats 5th 10th 50th 90th 95th
Trend -6.956 -6.366 -4.427 -2.407 -0.668
Number of Public Firms (log) -12.316 -11.814 -9.329 -6.554 -4.526
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - US|) 0.478 0.625 2.652 4.239 7.134
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - US|) 1.517 1.749 3.222 6.036 7.709
Percentile
Using annual data for U.S. firms between 1973 and 2006, we construct 100 random samples, each of which resembles 
our actual data set of 50 countries with respect to the cross-sectional and temporal variation in the number of firms 
used. For each random sample and each “country” within such a set, we compute the segmentation measure as we do 
for the actual data, with the U.S. market playing the role of the world market. For each sample, we regress the annual 
“country”-level segmentation measure on the following control variables: 1) a time trend, 2) the natural logarithm of 
the number of firms that are used in the construction of the segmentation measure for a given “country” in a given 
year, 3) the absolute difference between the industry leverage in a given “country” and the U.S. market as a whole, 
averaged across all industries in a given “country” and year, and 4) the absolute difference between the industry log 
earnings growth rate volatility in a given “country” and the U.S. market as a whole, averaged across all industries in a 
given “country” and year. We report the distribution of coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the 100 pooled OLS 
regressions. The reported t-statistics account for serial correlation by “country” and contemporaneous correlation 
across “countries”.  Table 4
Trends in Segmentation
Panel A: All Countries (1980 - 2005) Panel C: Emerging Market Countries (1988 - 2005)
II I I I I
Trend -0.0007 -0.0008 Trend -0.0012 -0.0011
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0007)






N  906 906 N  441 441
R
2 0.02 0.16 R
2 0.02 0.07










N  451 451
R
2 0.19 0.41
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|)
The sample includes 19 developed and 31 emerging-market countries detailed in Table 1. We regress the annual country-level segmentation 
measure SEG onto the following control variables: 1) a time trend, 2) the natural logarithm of the number of publicly traded firms in a given 
country and year, 3) the absolute difference between the industry leverage in a given country and the world  market as a whole, averaged across all 
industries in a given country and year, and 4) the absolute difference between the industry log earnings growth rate volatility in a given country and 
the world market as a whole, averaged across all industries in a given country and year. Panel A reports results for our entire sample, Panel B for 
developed countries only, and Panel C for emerging market countries (for comparability with Figure 1, we drop emerging market observations prior 
to 1988). We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. Reported standard errors in parentheses account for serial correlation by 
country and contemporaneous correlation across countries. We also perform Prais-Winsten regressions and calculate panel corrected standard 
errors. Bold coefficient estimates denote statistical significance at the 5% level under the panel OLS specification. Underlined coefficient estimates 
denote statistical significance under the Prais-Winsten specification. N denotes the number of country-years and R
2 denotes the coefficient of 
determination.  Table 5
Market Segmentation Determinants
1980 - 2005
Panel A: Equity Market Openness
I II III IV V
Equity Market Openness -0.0282 -0.0228 -0.0253 -0.0212
(0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0055)
Trade Openness -0.0289 -0.0151 -0.0122 -0.0092
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0107)
Trend -0.0008 -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0003)






N  906 906 906 906 906
R
2 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.24
Panel B: Capital Account Openness
I II III IV V
Capital Account Openness -0.0331 -0.0296 -0.0296 -0.0202
(0.0086) (0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0071)
Trade Openness -0.0185 -0.0076 -0.0063 -0.0063
(0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0072)
Trend -0.0006 -0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0003)






N  880 880 880 880 880
R
2 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.23
Abs. Difference in Financial Leverage 
(|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Financial Leverage 
(|Local - Global|)
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings 
Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|)
The sample includes 19 developed and 31 (29 in Panel B) emerging-market countries detailed in Table 1. We 
regress the annual country-level segmentation measure SEG onto the following variables: 1) the degree of equity 
market openness (investability) (Panel A) or a continuous measure of the degree of capital account openness from 
Quinn (only 48 countries are available) (Panel B), 2) a 0/1 indicator of trade openness based on trade liberalization 
dates from Wacziarg and Welch (2003), 3) a time trend, 4) the natural logarithm of the number of publicly traded 
firms in a given country and year, 5) the absolute difference between the industry leverage in a given country and 
the world  market as a whole, averaged across all industries in a given country and year, and 6) the absolute 
difference between the industry log earnings growth rate volatility in a given country and the world market as a 
whole, averaged across all industries in a given country and year.  We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS 
regressions. Reported standard errors in parentheses account for serial correlation by country and contemporaneous 
correlation across countries. We also perform Prais-Winsten regressions and calculate panel corrected standard 
errors. Bold coefficient estimates denote statistical significance at the 5% level under the panel OLS specification. 
Underlined coefficient estimates denote statistical significance under the Prais-Winsten specification. N denotes the 
number of country-years and R
2 denotes the coefficient of determination. Table 6












Capital Account Openness -0.0164 -0.0114
(0.0055) (0.0047)
[-0.0181, -0.0035]
Equity Market Openness -0.0149 -0.0071
(0.0047) (0.0043)
[-0.0195, -0.0064]
Trade Openness -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0014 -0.0018
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0073) (0.0076)
[-0.0134, -0.0036] [-0.0052, 0.0038]
Trade/GDP 0.0035
(0.0015)
Investment Profile -0.0277 -0.0279 -0.0300 -0.0371
(0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0070) (0.0100)
[-0.0328, -0.0074] [-0.0353, -0.0082]
Legal Origin (French) -0.0056 -0.0042
(0.0033) (0.0038)
[-0.0090, -0.0007]





MCAP/GDP -0.0056 -0.0068 -0.0054 -0.0058
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0024)
[-0.0145, -0.0060] [-0.0130, -0.0048]
U.S. Money Supply Growth 0.1026
(0.0382)
[0.0225, 0.1821]
World GDP Growth 0.2315 0.2590 0.2654
(0.1090) (0.1140) (0.1100)
[-0.1029, 0.2339]
U.S. Corporate Bond Spread 2.0605 2.2806 1.6139 2.6339
(0.4360) (0.5430) (0.3210) (0.4340)
[0.9646, 2.3691] [1.0317, 2.5450]
VIX Option Volatility Index 0.0465 0.0471 0.0438
(0.0148) (0.0099) (0.0100)
[-0.0048, 0.0551] [-0.0045, 0.0611]
Abs. Difference in Log Earnings Growth Volatility (|Local - Global|) 0.0911 0.0781 0.1044 0.0925
(0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0280) (0.0235)
[0.0905, 0.1320] [0.1003, 0.1299]
Number of Public Firms (log) -0.0042 -0.0022 -0.0044 -0.0025
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010)
[-0.0069, -0.0040] [-0.0054, -0.0032]
N 906 820 880 802
R
2 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.31
 Equity Market Openness Capital Account Openness
The sample includes (from left to right in the Table): 19/13/19/13 developed and 31/26/29/25 emerging-market countries detailed in Table 1. We regress the annual country-
level segmentation measure SEG onto the independent variables that have survived the model reduction algorithm (see Appendix Table 3).  For a detailed description of all 
variables, see Appendix Table 2. We report coefficient estimates from pooled OLS regressions. Reported standard errors in parentheses account for serial correlation by 
country and contemporaneous correlation across countries. We also perform Prais-Winsten regressions and calculate panel corrected standard errors. Bold coefficient estimates 
denote statistical significance at the 5% level under the panel OLS specification. Underlined coefficient estimates denote statistical significance under the Prais-Winsten 
specification. Finally, beneath the standard errors (for the main specifications only) in brackets we provide a confidence interval for each entry.  These are derived from a 
jackknife experiment where, for each surviving variable separately, we randomly sample from the 27 other possible variables (noted in Appendix Table 3) for which we have 
full sample data.  The number of additional variables and their identities are completely random, but we force the selection of between 8 and 27 additional variables.  For this 
set of explanatory variables, we perform a regression with SEG as the dependent variable, throw out variables with t-statistics below 1, and perform a regression on the 
remaining set. For each case, we retain the regression coefficient.  We iterate this procedure 1,000 times for each variable separately.  The 5 and 95% percentiles are presented 
in the brackets. N denotes the number of country-years and R
2 denotes the coefficient of determination. Table 7
Contribution of Market Segmentation Determinants
1980-2005













Equity Market Openness -0.0075 0.192 0.040 0.152 0.191 0.001
[0.095, 0.321]
Trade Openness -0.0016 0.056 0.012 0.044 0.053 0.003
[0.028, 0.133]
Investment Profile -0.0038 0.152 0.063 0.089 0.146 0.006
[0.049, 0.238]
MCAP/GDP -0.0010 0.100 0.043 0.057 0.087 0.013
[0.105, 0.324]
World GDP Growth 0.0031 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
[-0.009, 0.005]
U.S. Corporate Bond Spread 0.0098 0.141 0.141 0.141
[0.077, 0.195]
VIX Option Volatility Index 0.0034 0.034 0.034 0.034
[-0.004, 0.049]
Abs. Diff. in Log Earnings Growth 
Volatility (|Local - Global|) -0.0038 0.195 0.087 0.108 0.207 -0.011
[0.178, 0.304]






We further analyze the main specifications from Table 7. Panel A reports results for Equity Market Openness and Panel B for Capital Account Openness.  In 
each panel and for each segmentation determinant, we first report the product of the coefficient estimate and either the difference between the average value for 
developed countries and the average value for emerging market countries or, in the case of variables that vary only over time, one standard deviation of that 
variable. We then report results from a variance decomposition. In particular, we report the contribution of each variable to the variation of the predicted degree 
of segmentation, defined as the ratio of the covariance between the given variable and the predicted degree of segmentation relative to the variance of the 
predicted degree of segmentation. We further distinguish between the time-series (TS) and cross-sectional (CS) component of this overall contribution in two 
different ways. For details on this distinction, see the corresponding chapter of the paper.  Finally, beneath the estimated over all contribution in brackets we 
provide a confidence interval for each entry.  These are derived from a jackknife experiment where, for each surviving variable separately, we randomly sample 
from the 27 other possible variables (noted in Appendix Table 3) for which we have full sample data.  The number of additional variables and their identities 
are completely random, but we force the selection of between 8 and 27 additional variables.  For this set of explanatory variables, we perform a regression with 
SEG as the dependent variable, throw out variables with t-statistics below 1, and perform a regression on the remaining set. For each case, we retain the overall 
contribution that the particular variable makes for predicted segmentation.  We iterate this procedure 1,000 times for each variable separately.  The 5 and 95% 
percentiles are presented in the brackets.  Last, N denotes the number of country-years and R
2 denotes the coefficient of determination. 
 Table 7 (continued)













Capital Account Openness -0.0058 0.123 0.032 0.091 0.125 -0.001
[0.03, 0.191]
Trade Openness -0.0002 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000
[-0.02, 0.032]
Investment Profile -0.0038 0.161 0.079 0.081 0.153 0.007
[0.053, 0.256]
Legal Origin (French) 0.0013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017
[-0.031, -0.003]
MCAP/GDP -0.0009 0.110 0.052 0.058 0.093 0.016
[0.091, 0.345]
U.S. Money Supply Growth 0.0036 0.040 0.048 0.040
[0.013, 0.103]
U.S. Corporate Bond Spread 0.0077 0.149 0.182 0.149
[0.109, 0.296]
VIX Option Volatility Index 0.0034 0.049 0.040 0.049
[-0.005, 0.078]
Abs. Diff. in Log Earnings Growth 
Volatility (|Local - Global|) -0.0043 0.224 0.106 0.118 0.237 -0.013
[0.215, 0.36]


















































Linear (Emerging Markets Segmentation)
Linear (Developed Countries Segmentation)Figure 2  
Benchmarking the Segmentation Measure: Segmentation within the U.S., 1973 - 2006 














































Emerging Markets SegmentationAppendix Table 1
Data Availability
Source Code Name SEG data start Source Code Name SEG data start
DS AUS Australia 197301 EMDB ARG Argentina 198604
DS AUT Austria 197301 EMDB BGD Bangladesh 199601
DS BEL Belgium 197301 EMDB BRA Brazil 198604
DS CAN Canada 197301 EMDB CHL Chile 198601
DS DNK Denmark 197301 EMDB CHN China 199301
DS FIN Finland 198803 EMDB COL Colombia 198412
DS FRA France 197301 EMDB CIV Cote d'Ivoire 199601
DS DEU Germany 197301 EMDB EGY Egypt 199601
DS IRL Ireland 197301 DS GRC Greece 198903
DS ITA Italy 198601 EMDB IND India 198604
DS NLD Netherlands 197301 EMDB IDN Indonesia 198912
DS NZL New Zealand 198801 EMDB ISR Israel 199701
DS NOR Norway 198001 EMDB JAM Jamaica 199601
DS SGP Singapore 197301 EMDB JOR Jordan 198607
DS ESP Spain 198703 EMDB KEN Kenya 199601
DS SWE Sweden 198201 EMDB KOR Korea 198601
DS CHE Switzerland 197301 EMDB MYS Malaysia 198412
DS GBR United Kingdom 197301 EMDB MEX Mexico 198604
DS USA United States 197301 EMDB MAR Morocco 199601
EMDB NGA Nigeria 198412
EMDB PAK Pakistan 198601
EMDB PHL Philippines 198412
DS PRT Portugal 198801
DS ZAF South Africa 197301
EMDB LKA Sri Lanka 199301
EMDB THA Thailand 198601
EMDB TTO Trin. & Tobago 199601
EMDB TUN Tunisia 199601
EMDB TUR Turkey 198612
EMDB VEN Venezuela 198601
EMDB ZWE Zimbabwe 198601
Developed Emerging
Appendix Table 1 lists the source of the data used in the construction of the measure of segmentation SEG: 
Datastream (DS) or Standard & Poors' Emerging Market Data Base (EMDB). The table also lists the country 
code and the corresponding country name as well as the first year for which the segmentation measure is 
available. In our analysis, we generally only include observations after 1979 for which our main independent 
variables are available. Due to the calculations of the volatility of log earning growth, a country with data 
availability starting after 1977 is included in our analysis with a delay of two years. For Figures 1 and 2, we 
report observations prior to 1980. For those early years, we include all data points available. Appendix Table 2
Description of all Variables
Variable Description
SEG SEG measures the valueweighted average of the absolute difference between a country's local industry 
earnings yields and the corresponding global industry earnings yields. Available for all countries. For details, 
see sections 2 and 3. Frequency: Monthly and Annual. Sources: Datastream and  Standard & Poors' 
Emerging Market Data Base.
Openness
Capital account openness Quinn’s capital account openness measure is created from the text of the annual volume published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.   Quinn’s 
openness measure is scored 0-4, in half integer units, with 4 representing a fully open economy.  The 
measure hence facilitates a more nuanced view of capital account openness than the usual 0/1 indicator, and 
is available for 48 countries in our study.  We transform the measure into a 0 to 1 scale.  Frequency: Annual
Equity market openness Following Bekaert (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2003), the equity market openness measure is based on 
the ratio of the market capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable index to those 
that comprise the IFC Global index for each country.  The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion 
restrictions, is designed to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, whereas the IFC 
Investable index is designed to represent a portfolio of domestic equities that are available to foreign 
investors.  A ratio of one means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors.  Fully segmented 
countries have an intensity measure of zero, and fully liberalized countries have an intensity measure of one. 
Frequency: Annual
Gross FDI/GDP Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct 
investment recorded in the balance of payments financial account. It includes equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital.  The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP.  
Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators .
Trade openness We obtain the trade liberalization dates developed in Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  Wacziarg and Welch 
look at five factors: average tariff rates of 40% or more; nontariff barriers covering 40% or more of trade; a 
black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate, on 
average, during the 1970s or 1980s; a state monopoly on major exports; and a socialist economic system. If a 
country meets any of these five criteria, it is classified with indicator variable equal to zero and deemed 
closed.  Frequency: Annual. 
Trade/GDP The sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.  
Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators .
Political Risk and Institutions
Quality of institutions The sum of ICRG subcomponents: Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality. Available for all 
countries. Frequency: Annual.
     Corruption ICRG political risk sub-component. This is a measure of corruption within the political system.  Such 
corruption distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and 
introduces an inherent instability into the political process. The most common form of corruption met 
directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans.  
Although the PRS measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors,” secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.  In PRS's view these sorts of corruption 
pose risk to foreign business, potentially leading to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on 
the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market. Frequency: Annual.
     Law and order ICRG political risk sub-component. PRS assesses Law and Order separately, with each sub-component 
comprising zero to three points.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality 
of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating  (1.0) if the law 
is ignored for a political aim. Frequency: Annual.Appendix Table 2
(Continued)
Variable Description
     Bureaucratic quality ICRG political risk sub-component. The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy can act as a 
shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change.  Therefore, high points 
are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.  In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends 
to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment 
and training.  Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a 
change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative 
functions.  Frequency: Annual.
Investment profile ICRG political risk sub-component. Investment Profile reflects the risk of expropriation, contract viability, 
payment delays, and the ability to repatriate profits.  This measure is closely associated with the 
attractiveness of a country for FDI.  Available for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.
Insider trading law Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document the enactment of insider trading laws and the first prosecution of 
these laws. We construct two indicator variables. The first takes the value of one following the introduction 
of an insider trading law. The second takes the value of one after the law's first prosecution. Available for all 
countries.  Frequency: Annual.
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (English, French, 
Socialist, German, Scandinavian). We construct three indicators that take the value of one when the legal 
origin is Anglo-Saxon (English law), French (French law), or other (law other), and zero otherwise. This 
variable is purely cross-sectional and available for all countries. The source is La Porta, Lopez-di-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). Available for all countries. 
Financial Development
Illiquidity Following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), Lesmond (2005), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2007), we construct the illiquidity measure as the proportion of zero daily returns observed over the relevant 
year for each equity market.  We obtain daily returns data in local currency at the firm level from the 
Datastream research files.  For each country, we observe daily returns (using closing prices) for a large 
collection of firms. The total number of firms available from the Datastream research files accounts for about
90%, on average, of the number of domestically listed firms reported by the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.  For each country, we calculate the capitalization-weighted proportion of zero daily 
returns across all firms, and average this proportion over the year. Available for 46 countries. Frequency: 
Annual.
Equity market turnover The ratio of equity market value traded to the market capitalization.  The data are available for all countries.  
Frequency: Annual.  Source: Standard and Poor's/International Finance Corporation's   Emerging Stock 
Markets Factbook & World Bank Development Indicators.
MYY R
2 synchronicity Equity market synchronicity as developed in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). The measure is an annual value-
weighted local market model R
2 obtained from each firm's daily returns regressed on the local market 
portfolio return for that year. Available for 47 countries.  Frequency: Annual.
Private credit/GDP Private credit divided by gross domestic product. Credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  Available for all countries. Frequency: 
Annual.  Source:   World Bank Development Indicators .  
MCAP/GDP Equity market capitalization divided by gross domestic product. Available for all countries.  Frequency: 
Annual.  Source:   World Bank Development Indicators .  
Risk Appetite and Business Cycle
G7 real rate Weighted average real short term interest rate in G7 countries: the prime lending interest rate adjusted for 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator.  Frequency: Annual.
U.S. money supply growth Annual growth in money supply (M2) for the United States.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators .
U.S. risk aversion We measure U.S. risk aversion based on the parameter estimates of the habit-persistence model from 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  Frequency: Annual.  Source: Bekaert and Engstrom (2008).
World GDP growth Growth of real world per capita gross domestic product.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators.
U.S. corporate bond spread The yield spread between U.S. BAA and AAA rated bonds obtianed from the Federal Reserve Board.  
Frequency: Annual.Appendix Table 2
(Continued)
Variable Description
VIX option volatility index The VIX option volatility  index available from the CBOE (www.cboe.com). The Deecember value of the 
volatility index is used for each year. The volatility index covers 1986 to the present, before which we take 
the square root of the average daily squared CRSP U.S. total market return over the year to extend the index 
back to 1980.  Frequency: Annual.
Past local equity market return The lagged annual return, from December to December, on the country-level market portfolio. Available for 
all counries.  Frequency: Annual.  Sources: Datastream and  Standard & Poors' Emerging Market Data 
Base.
World equity market volatility The variance of the world market portfolio return, measured as the five-year rolling variance of the monthly 
return on the world market portfolio.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: Datastream.
Information Variables
Phone lines per 100 people Number of fixed lines and mobile phone subscribers per 100 people.  Available for all countries and years.  
Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators .  
Internet users per 100 people Number of internet users per 100 people.  Available for all countries and years.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: 
World Bank Development Indicators .  
International voice traffic The number of minutes of international phone calls per person.  Available for a subset of countries and 
years.  Frequency: Annual. Source:  World Bank Development Indicators.  
Growth Determinants
Initial log GDP Logarithm of real per capita gross domestic product reset every five years in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 
2000. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Secondary school enrollment Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education. Accordingly, the reported value can
exceed (or average) more than 100%. Available for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators.
Log life expectancy Growth rate of total population which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Available 
for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Population growth Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Available for all countries.  
Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Controls
Number of public firms (log ) The log of the number of publicly traded firms in a given country.  Frequency: Annual.  Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators.
Number of public firms (log ) (U.S. benchmark) The natural logarithm of the number of U.S. public firms used in the construction of the segmentation 
measure for a given state or "country" in a given year. Frequency: Annual.
Abs. difference in financial leverage (|Local - Global|) We obtain annual accounting data for all public firms contained in Bureau van Dijk's OSIRIS data base. For 
industrial firms, we define financial leverage as the ratio of long term interest bearing debt to total assets. For 
financial firms, we define financial leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Weighting each 
observation by total assets, we aggregate this ratio across all firms per industry, country and year. Since 
coverage is limited in time and across industries and countries, we use linear regressions based on country 
dummies, industry dummies, private credit over GDP as well as industry return volatility to predict industry 
leverage when leverage data are not available. We then take the absolute difference between local industry 
leverage and the corresponding global industry leverage which we calculate as the weighted average across 
all firms around the world in a given industry. Finally, for each country and year we average this absolute 
leverge difference across all industries in a country using an industry's market value as its weight.  Available 
for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.Appendix Table 2
(Continued)
Variable Description
Abs. difference in financial leverage (|Local - US|) Used in the U.S. Benchmark Analysis
Industry leverage is the ratio of long term debt, data item 9 in Compustat, summed over all firms in a given 
industry and state/"country", to total assets, data item 6 in Compustat, summed over all firms in a given 
industry and state/"country".  We use an industry's equity market value to average the absolute differences 
between state/"country" and U.S. market leverage across all industries in a given state/"country".  Frequency:
Annual.
Used in robustness when differentials are measured relative to U.S. earnings yields
We obtain annual accounting data for all public firms contained in Bureau van Dijk's OSIRIS data base. For 
industrial firms, we define financial leverage as the ratio of long term interest bearing debt to total assets. For 
financial firms, we define financial leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Weighting each 
observation by total assets, we aggregate this ratio across all firms per industry, country and year. Since 
coverage is limited in time and across industries and countries, we use linear regressions based on country 
dummies, industry dummies, private credit over GDP as well as industry return volatility to predict industry 
leverage when leverage data are not available. We then take the absolute difference between local industry 
leverage and the corresponding U.S. industry leverage. Finally, for each country and year we average this 
absolute leverge difference across all industries in a country using an industry's market value as its weight.  
Available for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.
Abs. difference in log earnings growth volatility
(|Local - Global|)
We measure log earnings growth volatility by calculating the five-year standard deviation of quarterly log 
growth rates of 12-month earnings for all industries at the country and global level.  We require at least eight 
quarters of data for the calculation.  We then form the weighted average of the absolute difference between 
local and global industry log earnings growth volatility for each country and year,  where we use industry 
market values as weights. Available for all countries.  Frequency: Annual.
Abs. difference in log earnings growth volatility
(|Local - US|)
Used in the U.S. Benchmark Analysis
We calculate the volatility of log industry earnings growth each December by aggregating quarterly firm-
level earnings across firms with consecutive earnings data in a given industry and state/"country", taking the 
log of the growth rate in industry earnings and calculating the standard deviation of the log growth rate over 
the past 20 quarters, as long as we have non-missing data for at least eight quarters. We use an industry's 
equity market  value to average the absolute differences between state/"country" and U.S. market log 
earnings growth volatility across all industries in a given state/"country".  Frequency: Annual.
Used in robustness when differentials are measured relative to U.S. earnings yields
We measure log earnings growth volatility by calculating the five-year standard deviation of quarterly log 
earnings growth rate for all industries at the country.  We require at least eight quarters of data for the 
calculation.  We then form the weighted average of the absolute difference between local and U.S. industry 
log earnings growth volatility for each country and year,  where we use industry market values as weights. 
Available for all countries. Frequency: Annual.
While the list is long, we considered several other potentially useful measures, such as earnings expectations, measures of regulatory conditions and labor 

























Constant Fixed Positive Fixed Negative Fixed Positive Fixed Negative
Trend X X Positive X X Positive
Openness
Capital Account Openness X Negative Fixed Negative
Equity Market Openness X Negative Fixed Negative
Trade Openness Fixed Negative Fixed Negative Fixed Negative Fixed Negative
Gross FDI/GDP XX
Trade/GDP X X X X Positive
Political Risk and 
Institutions
Quality of Institutions X XXX
Investment Profile X Negative X Negative X Negative X Negative
Law and Order X XXX
Insider Trading Law X XXX
Insider Trading Prosecution X XXX
Legal Origin (English) X XXX
Legal Origin (French) X X Negative X Negative X
Financial Development
Local Equity Market Illiquidity X Positive X
Local Equity Market Turnover XXXX
MYY R
2 Synchronicity X Positive X
Private Credit/GDP X XXX
MCAP/GDP X Negative X Negative X Negative X Negative
Risk Appetite and Business 
Cycles
G7 Real Rate X XXX
U.S. Money Supply Growth X X X Positive X
U.S. Risk Aversion X XXX
World GDP Growth X Positive X Positive X X Positive
U.S. Corporate Bond Spread X Positive X Positive X Positive X Positive
VIX Option Volatillity Index X Positive X X Positive X Positive
Past Local Equity Market 
Return XX
World Equity Market Volatility X XXX
Information Variables
Phone Lines per 100 people XXXX
Internet Users per 100 people XXXX
Growth Determinants
Initial Log GDP X XXX
Secondary School Enrollment X XXX
Log Life Expectancy X XXX
Population Growth X XXX
Controls
Abs. Difference in Financial 
Leverage (|Local - Global|) X
XXX
Abs. Difference in Log 
Earnings Growth Volatility 
(|Local - Global|)
X Positive X Positive X Positive X Positive
Number of Public Firms (log) X Negative X Negative X Negative X Negative
Number of Variables 30 9 34 12 30 10 34 11
Capital Account Openness Equity Market Openness








Appendix Table 3 lists the independent variables that are part of the unrestricted econometric model (marked by X or Fixed – Fixed indicates that a variable was forced to survive the reduction 
process) as well as those that survive the model reduction algorithm (marked by Positive / Negative – indicating the sign of the estimated coefficient).  The dependent variable is the measured 
degree of segmentation SEG. For a detailed description of all variables, see Appendix Table 2.  N denotes the number of country-years. 